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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article compares and contrasts two similar but unfamiliar 
cases decided in western Massachusetts, Westfield Chemical Corp. v. 
Burroughs Corp. 1 and Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp.2 Westfield 
and Black are typical of a certain genre of disputes that has developed 
• Partner, Bigelow & SaItzberg, Woburn, Massachusetts. Member, Computer Law 
Association. B.A. Boston University, 1969; M.B.A. Boston University, 1973; J.D. Suffolk 
University, 1976. 
sity, 1975; J.D. Suffolk University (cum laude), 1982. 
.. Associate, Bigelow & Saltzberg, Woburn, Massachusetts. A.B. Brown Univer­
I. 21 UCC Rep. Servo 1293, [1977] 6 COMPo L. SERVo REP. 438 (Mass. Sup. Ct.). 
The full text of the agreements signed by the parties are set forth in 6 C.L.S.R. at 445-452. 
The judge was John M. Greaney, now Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court. 
2. No. 78-30777-F (D. Mass. December 18, 1981) (also a slip opinion on Lexis). The 
judge was Frank M. Freedman, United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts. 
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in recent y~ars: the computer contract case.3 In the typical computer 
contract case, the plaintiff is a small business which purchases (or 
leases) a computer system under a written agreement and the defend­
ant is the seller and manufacturer of the computer system.4 When the 
computer does not work as expected and the user sues, the causes of 
action generally sound in contract (breach of warranty) and tort 
(misrepresentation). 
Burroughs was a defendant in these two cases and has been in­
volved in many such cases. 5 Burroughs, however, is certainly not the 
only computer vendor which has experienced this type of litigation.6 
3. Since neither Westfield nor Black is reported in the West System, the full text of 
each is reprinted in ApPENDIX A and ApPENDIX B of this article. 
4. See text accompanying note 3. 
5. See, e.g., Badger Bearing v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wisc. 1977); 
Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), affd, 681 
F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982); Burroughs Corp. v. Century Steel, Inc., 99 Nev. 464, 664 P.2d 
354 (1983); Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, 423 So.2d 1348 (Ala. 1982); Burroughs 
Corp. v. Macon Rubber Co., 154 Ga. App. 322 (1980); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Bur­
roughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Chesapeake Petroleum Supply Co. v. 
Burroughs Corp., [1977] 6 CoMP. L. SERVo REP. 768, No. 40267 (Maryland), affd on other 
grounds, 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978); Earman Oil CO. V. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 
1291 (5th Cir. 1980); Edwin Pearl, Inc. V. Burroughs Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 1031,468 N.E.2d 
700 (1984); Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., No. C-84-0523-WWS 
(N.D. Cal., September 19, 1984); Hi Neighbor Enterprises, Inc. V. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. 
Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 
(D.S.C. 1974); Iten Leasing CO. V. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982); Kalil 
Bottling Co. V. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. App. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980); Loveley V. 
Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974); Quad County Distributing Co., Inc. 
V. Burroughs Corp., 68 Ill. App. 3d 163 (1979); Reimer Meat Products, Inc. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 96 Wisc. 2d 737, 293 N.W.2d 184 (1980); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. V. Bur­
roughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980); Sullivans of Liberty, Inc. V. Bur­
roughs Corp., 57 A.D.2d 664, 393 N.Y.S.2d 626 (3rd Dept. 1977); Sun 'n Fun Stores, Inc. 
V. Burroughs Corp., No. 79-2450-MA (D. Mass. 1982); Suntogs of Miami, Inc. V. Bur­
roughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla. App. 1983); Tilden Financial Corp. V. Palo Tire Servo V. 
Burroughs Corp., 596 F.2d 604 (3rd Cir. 1979); U.S. Welding, Inc. V. Burroughs Corp., 
587 F. Supp. 49 (D. Col. 1984); Walter E. Heller & CO. V. Burroughs Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 
213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977); W.R. Weaver V. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Texas 
1979). 
6. See. e.g., The Glovatorium, Inc. V. National Cash Register Corp., 684 F.2d 658 
(9th Cir. 1982); Conway Publications v. Data Gen. Corp., No. C82-1862A (N.D. Ga., 
August 17, 1983); IBM v. Catamore, 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976); Dunn Appraisal V. 
Honeywell Information Sys., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982); Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell 
Information Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Computer Sys. Engineering, Inc. 
V. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Mass. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984); 
Diversified Environments, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 461 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Pa. 1978); 
Teamsters Security Fund of Northern California V. Sperry Rand Corp., [1976] 6 COMPo L. 
SERVo REP. 951 (N.D. Cal.). 
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Both Black and Westfield are summary judgment opinions.7 In 
many of these cases, the summary judgment hearing is dispositive be­
cause the standard form agreement bars the introduction of testimo­
nial evidence that varies or contradicts the carefully drafted language 
of the vendor or lessor's form agreement, leaving no issues of fact to be 
determined. In both Black and Westfield,·Burroughs moved for sum­
mary judgment on all contract and tort issues.8 In both cases, the 
contract issues were decided in favor of the computer vendor at the 
summary judgment hearing.9 Summary judgment with respect to the 
tort claims, however, was granted in Westfield lO and denied in Black. II 
There is no indication of any subsequent proceeding in the Westfield 
case. Presumably the plaintiff did not appeal, but may have reached a 
settlement with Burroughs after summary judgment was granted. 
Before trial on the tort counts, the Black case was settled. 
II. THE CLAIMS AND THE RULINGS 
A. Westfield Chemical Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 
In Westfield, the plaintiff was a disgruntled purchaser of a Bur­
roughs computer system. The action was in five counts: (1) breach of 
Burroughs' express warranty that the computer system would gener­
ate efficiency and time savings and was fit for plaintiffs accounting 
system; 12 (2) breach of contract with plaintiff to develop, maintain, 
and service the system; 13 (3) breach of the implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular use;14 (4) negligent manufacture of the proposed sys­
tem;15 and (5) fraudulent inducement. 16 
The court entered summary judgment for the defendant on all 
counts. 
In disposing of counts 1 and 3, the court first noted that the de­
fendant's standard written equipment sales contract and application 
software supported the contract as executed by the plaintiff and dis­
claimed the implied and express warranties which the plaintiff claimed 
7. See supra note 3. Subsequent page citations to Westfield and Black will refer to 
ApPENDIX A and ApPENDIX B infra pages 548-570. 
8. Black, ApPENDIX B, at 554; Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 548. 
9. See Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 553; Black, ApPENDIX B at 554. 
10. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 553. 
11. Black, ApPENDIX B at 569. 
12. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 548. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 548-49. 
16. Id. at 549. 
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had been breached. 17 The court also found the disclaimers were con­
spicuous. IS Furthermore, the court concluded the standard agreement 
limitation of damages against the vendor was proper. 19 Finally, the 
court ruled that the limited remedy provided under Burroughs' stan­
dard contract did not fail of its essential purpose.20 
With respect to count 2, the plaintiff alleged only that there had 
been delays in the providing of maintenance by the defendant; plaintiff 
did not allege that the defendant had failed to supply the quality of 
maintenance for which the parties had contracted. The court ruled, 
therefore, that Burroughs had not breached its maintenance contract 
which provided that it would not be liable for damages or losses in 
providing maintenance.21 The court then granted the defendant sum­
mary judgment on count 2.22 
With respect to count 4, the court ruled that the plaintiff's claim 
for negligent manufacture of the system was duplicative of the war­
ranty and contract counts. 23 
Finally, the court disposed of count 5, in which the plaintiff al­
leged it had been fraudulently induced to purchase the defendant's sys­
tem. The plaintiff contended there was a statement in Burroughs' pre­
sales proposal which claimed plaintiff would experience substantial 
man-hour savings from the system. The court held that this misrepre­
sentation could not have been made by the sales representative with 
personal knowledge.24 Such a statement, therefore, could not have 
been made with fraudulent intent.25 The plaintiff, according to Judge 
Greaney, could not have reasonably relied on this misrepresentation.26 
Moreover, evidence of the misrepresentation was excluded by the en­
tire contract clause of the parties' agreement. 
B. Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp. 
In Black, the plaintiff was a Massachusetts business trust engaged 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. The court determined that where the loss is commercial, as in the present 
case, limitation of damages is not prima Jacie unconscionable, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 106, § 2-719(3) (West 1958). The court then found the limitation of damages proper. 
Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 549-50. 
20. [d. at 550. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 553. 
24. Id. at 550-52. 
25. Id. at 551. 
26. Id. at 552. 
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in the wholesale distribution of newspapers, magazines, and paperback 
books.27 It purchased a computer system from Burroughs with which 
to operate this business.28 The promised software, however, was never 
fully delivered. Black's complaint contained three counts: (1) breach 
of contract;29 (2) knowing and willful violation of the Massachusetts 
Consumer Protection Act;30 and (3) tortious misrepresentation.31 The 
court ~ranted Burroughs' motion for summary judgment under count 
132 but denied the motion with respect to counts 233 and 3.34 
In its breach of contract claim, plaintiff raised two issues: (1) that 
defendant anticipatorily breached its contractual obligations;3s and 
(2) that the exclusive remedies provisions of the contract between the 
parties did not contemplate the nature of breach present in this case 
and, therefore, failed of their essential purpose.36 As the court noted, 
however, the plaintiff did not cite any instance in which the defendant 
made an unequivocal declaration of its intent not to perform.37 More­
over, the contract as originally signed had been amended to extend the 
time for Burroughs to perform to a later date than the date of the 
initiation of the action.38 Citing decisions from other courts, the Black 
court also pointed out that the defendant's standard form contracts 
were valid and enforceable.39 
With respect to count 3, the court found that the defendant had 
superior knowledge of the capabilities of its hardware and software 
products40 and that in such a situation representations of future events 
may be actionable. Hence, there were sufficient material issues of fact 
to preclude summary judgment.41 
Finally, with respect to the plaintiff's Chapter 93A claim, the 
court denied summary judgment and rejected the defendant's claim 
27. Black, ApPENDIX B at 554. 
28. [d. at 555. 
29. [d. at 556. 
30. [d. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1958 & Supp. 1984). 
31. Black, ApPENDIX B at 557. 
32. [d. at 569. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. Note that Judge Freedman also allowed the plaintiff to add a fourth count 
for negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 554, 567-68. 
35. [d. at 560. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. at 562. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. at 563. 
40. [d. at 564. 
41. [d. at 564-65. 
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that the action was exempt from the Consumer Protection ACt.42 
III. CONTRACT ISSUES 
Three clauses are found in practically every computer equipment 
sales agreement:43 (1) the manufacturer warrants the equipment to be 
free from defects in material or workmanship for a period of time 
(usually less than one year); (2) the manufacturer disclaims all other 
warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to the implied 
warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose; and 
(3) the written agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the 
customer and seller with respect to the equipment and related services 
to be furnished, and the written agreement supersedes all prior com­
munications between the parties, including all oral and written 
proposals. 
The combined effect of the three clauses has been, in many cases, 
to eliminate almost any chance of a successful claim for breach of ex­
press or implied warranties. The first provides that the manufacturer 
will service any defective equipment for the period of the warranty. 
The second and third clauses provide that the manufacturer does not 
warrant the performance or capacity of the computer system. The 
third clause makes inadmissible any oral or written statements not 
within the four corners of the agreement or incorporated therein by 
specific reference. This so-called merger clause takes advantage of the 
parol evidence rule44 to exclude sales literature or sales talk that might 
otherwise be found to create an express warranty. Such clauses have 
been held to shield computer vendors entirely from warranty liability 
for computer systems that do not work as expected.45 
42. Id. at 565-67. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § 3 (West 1958 & Supp. 
1984) which states: 
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise per­
mitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under 
statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States. 
For the purpose of this section, the burden of proving exemptions from the 
provision of this chapter shall be upon the person claiming the exemptions. 
Id. 
43. For a discussion of computer equipment sales agreements, see Gordon & Starr, 
Software Development Contracts and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforce­
ability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 487, 493-505 (1985). 
44. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-202 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984). 
45. In addition to Black and Westfield. see Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 
(D.S.C. 1974); Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 
1981), affd, 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982) (express warranty did not include printed circuit 
boards which the court classified as expendable parts). 
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One method of attacking these clauses is to claim that the dis­
claimers are unconscionable, in violation of Uniform Commercial 
Code section 2-302(1).46 
A. Unconscionability 
In Westfield, Judge Greaney concluded that the agreement was 
not unconscionable because the contract was between businessmen 
who presumably acted at arm's length.47 There was no indication in 
the opinion that the court had any evidence before it as to the com­
mercial setting, or the purpose and effect of the agreement, on which it 
could consider the unconscionability of the contract. Uniform Com­
mercial Code Section 2-302(2)48 provides, however, that a court 
should afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present such evi­
dence when it is claimed, or appears to the court, that the contract, or 
any clause thereof, may be unconscionable. The existence of an issue 
of unconscionability has been found to preclude the granting of sum­
mary judgment.49 
In Black, Judge Freedman cited both Westfield and Earman Oil 
Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. so for the proposition that the Burroughs 
standard form sales agreements were not unconscionable. There was, 
however, no discussion in the opinion of commercial setting, purpose, 
and effect. 
In Earman Oil, Judge Brown, after discussing some of the criteria 
for finding unconscionability, ruled that the contract was not uncon­
sionable. In a footnote, however, he suggested that the district court 
had invited counsel to present evidence concerning the question of un­
46. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978) Provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon­
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause 
as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
Id. 
47. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 550. 
48. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1978) provides: 
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof 
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court 
in making the determination. 
Id. 
49. Electronics Corp. of Am. v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066,286 N.Y.S.2d 711 
(1967) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-302 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984»; Reynolds v. 
Preferred Mutual Insurance Co., 49 Mass. App. Dec. 97 (1972), [1972] 11 U.C.C. REP. 
SERVo 701; see Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537,278 A.2d 154 (1971). 
50. 625 F.2d 1291,1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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conscionability, but no such evidence was presented. Judge Brown re­
lied on Potomac Electric Power Company v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp. 51 for the criteria by which a court will determine the existence of 
unconscionability. The five criteria are: (1) examination ofthe negoti­
ation process as to length of time in dealing; (2) the length of time for 
deliberations; (3) the experience or astuteness of the parties; 
(4) whether counsel reviewed the contract; and (5) whether the buyer 
was a reluctant purchaser. 52 Applying those criteria, Judge Brown 
found there was no evidence to show that the contract as executed 
between Earman Oil and Burroughs was unconscionable. He imposed 
a rebuttable presumption of arm's length dealings in commercial set­
tings, however, saying that a standard form contract such as Bur­
roughs', as executed by a business person in a commercial setting, is 
presumed to be conscionable unless proven otherwise. Judge Freed­
man in Black appears to cite Westfield for the proposition that the 
presumption is conclusive, which is inconsistent with both the Uni­
form Commercial Code and Earman Oil: 
. . . I note that Black has not challenged the terms and conditions 
of the Burroughs standard forms on the basis of unconscionability, 
and the precedents cited by Burroughs suggest that such a challenge 
would be fruitless. 53 
The authors suggest that if Judge Greaney in Westfield and Judge 
Freedman in Black had had the benefit of a full factual investigation 
and full briefing on the issue, the more reasoned approach by Judge 
Brown in Earman Oil would likely have emerged. 
In several non-computer cases in other jurisdictions, the pre­
sumption of conscionability has been overcome. 54 
The unconscionability issue was also raised in at least one prior 
computer contract case. In The Glovatorium, Inc. v. National Cash 
Register Corp., 55 Judge William W. Schwarzer, in the course of a hear­
ing on motion for judgment non obstante veredicto on May 1, 1981, 
stated: 
I think this is perhaps a classic case of protecting a purchaser 
51. 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 527 F.2d 
853 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
52. Id. at 579. See also Earman Oil, 625 F.2d at 1299. 
53. Black, ApPENDIX B at 560. 
54. Frank's Maintenance and Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 
980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980), Industralease Automated & Scientific Equipment Corp. v. 
R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 482,396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977), Butcher v. Gar­
rett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978). 
55. No. C79-3393WWS (N.D. Cal.), affd, 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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against this kind of contract, of the necessity of protecting a pur­
chaser who is innocent of an appreciation of the consequence of a 
deficiency. 
In the first place he relies on the reputation of NCR and its 
experience, its competence, the fact that it's been making computers 
for a long time and surely knows what it's doing and has a substan­
tial organization to back it up. All of those things would lead a 
purchaser to put his trust in NCR, and certainly in this case, the 
purchaser was induced to do that. So. . . and induced to do so 
erroneously, under circumstances that support a finding offraud, on 
the basis of misleading incorrect information. 
But aside from that. The second branch of the-of this analy­
sis is that a purchaser who has no experience in computers doesn't 
have any inkling of-how wrong these things can go, and this case 
is a good demonstration of what it can do to a business when it 
doesn't work properly, and the fact that even though you're dealing 
with a huge company, with enormous experience, that doesn't give 
you any assurance that they are going to be able to remedy the de­
fects in their products. 
So it seems to me if there is ever a reason for holding that these 
provisions in these contracts should not be enforced because of un­
conscionability, this is the a-number one case. S6 
Westfield has been cited by B1ack,S7 Earman Oil,s8 and W.R. 
Weaver v. Burroughs Corp. S9 as authority for the proposition that Bur­
roughs' standard form agreement has not been shown to be uncon­
scionable. As noted above, however, Uniform Commercial Code 
section 2-302 provides that such a proposition is subject to a factual 
examination.60 The logical result is that the issue of unconscionabil­
ity, once it is raised, must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The 
existence of such an issue should, therefore, preclude the grant of sum­
mary judgment, unless the party alleging unconscionability is unable 
to present credible evidence of the commercial setting, purpose, and 
effect of the standard form agreement. 
56. N. Cohen, 1 Computer Law Reporter I, 149·150 (July 1982) (transcript). See 
also Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co. v. Burroughs Corp., [1977] 6 CoMP. L. SERVo 
REP., (Callaghan) 768, 769, affd on other grounds, 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978) 
(unconscionability rendered disclaimers ineffective). 
57. Black, ApPENDIX B at 560. 
58. Earman Oil, 625 F.2d at 1300. 
59. 580 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Texas 1979). 
60. See supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text. 
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B. Limitation of Remedies 
If the disappointed computer buyer overcomes the hurdles of the 
disclaimers of warranty and their presumed conscionability so as to 
state a cause of action for breach of warranty, the next issue is whether 
the warranty was breached. Usually, the vendor warrants that it will 
repair or replace an item of equipment found defective within the war­
ranty period.61 When a vendor cannot make the computer system 
work and the equipment itself is free from defects in material or work­
manship, the warranty can be said to fail of its essential purpose. The 
limited warranty of repair or replacement of a defective piece of equip­
ment may be no solution to the problem. In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. 
National Cash Register Corp.,62 the court stated, "Because NCR never 
furnished four of the six promised functions, their attempted limita­
tion of remedy failed of its essential purpose. CSI was therefore de­
prived of the substantial value of its bargain."63 
When the court reaches the conclusion that the essential purposes 
of the remedy failed, UCC section 2-719(2)64 comes into play. One of 
the remedies otherwise available under the UCC is the recovery of 
consequential damages, which is exactly what the disappointed buyer 
is seeking. 
Section 2-719(3)65 of the Uniform Commercial Code expressly 
authorizes the limitation of consequential damages unless the limita­
tion is unconscionable. Such a limitation is presumably unconsciona­
ble in consumer transactions, and presumably conscionable in 
commercial loss cases.66 Pursuant to UCC section 2-714(2),67 the 
buyer would be entitled to its benefit of the bargain damages (the dif­
ference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the 
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as 
61. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 43 at 497. 
62. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.]. 1979), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 670 F.2d 
1304 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
63. 479 F. Supp. at 745. 
64. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978) provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or 
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this 
Code." Id. 
65. U.c.c. § 2-719(3) (1978) provides: "Consequential damages may be limited or 
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential 
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconsciona­
ble but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." Id. 
66. Id. 
67. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978) provides: "The measure of damages for breach of war­
ranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods 
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special 
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." Id. 
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warranted), unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a 
different amount. 68 Generally, the upper limit ofUCC section 2-714(2) 
damages is the contract price plus incidental damages.69 There are, 
however, situations where the benefit of the bargain could exceed the 
contract price.70 
In Westfield, the court did not address the "failure of essential 
purpose" issue. In Black, Judge Freedman acknowledged that there 
are cases "where a limited repair and replacement remedy essentially 
eviscerates a contract of its substance,"71 but held Black was not such 
a case.72 The time for Burroughs' performance was November 1, 
1978. Black, however, cancelled the agreements in August 1978, 
before Burrough's performance was finally due. Black's claim of an­
ticipatory repudiation failed. "Nevertheless, the exclusive and limited 
remedies of the AES [Agreement for Equipment Sale] and SSA 
[Software and Support Agreement] could not have failed oftheir es­
sential purpose before they even became applicable. "73 
IV. THE ISSUE OF FRAUD 
A. Overview 
In the typical computer system acquisition case, the computer 
purchaser or lessee, unless it has great economic bargaining power, 
will have to execute the computer vendor's standard form purchase or 
lease contracts. Although the purchaser or lessee may succeed in get­
ting the vendor to amend some parts of its standard forms, the con­
tract normally will continue to contain the standard disclaimer of 
warranties and limitations of liabilities provisions discussed above. In 
this case, as we have seen, the user's actions for breach of contract in 
the event of default by the vendor can be extremely limited. If the user 
is able to include counts for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation by 
the vendor, however, it may have a greater chance that its litigation 
will succeed. 
To survive in the competitive marketplace, a computer vendor 
may make many written and oral statements designed to induce the 
user to select its products and services. Many of these representations 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See Chados Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 
1982). 
71. Black, ApPENDIX B at 563. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
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will be made in the vendor's product literature and company 
brochures. If the user has enough time to analyze the various systems 
offered, the user may request, and the vendor may submit, a proposal 
which describes the vendor's system that can be designed, imple­
mented, and installed to "meet the customer's needs." Oral state­
ments made by salespeople and marketing analysts are another source 
of representations upon which a user may rely in making its decision. 
Consequently, vendors use the kind of protective language that ap­
pears in their standard contracts to shield themselves against unau­
thorized statements made by their sales representatives, or a user's 
mistaken interpretation of proper sales talk. 74 
Under common law principles, if the user can show that any of 
these representations (which may include nondisclosures or omissions 
of certain facts) were made fraudulently, with the intent to induce the 
user to obtain the vendor's products and services, and that the user 
obtained the vendor's system relying on such misstatements to its det­
riment, a valid cause of action for fraud or deceit willlie.7s 
B. Westfield and Black: A Preliminary Examination 
At first glance, it may appear that the law in Massachusetts has 
gone in opposite directions with respect to whether a customer actu­
ally can succeed in bringing an action for fraud against a computer 
vendor for its misrepresentations. In Westfield, the plaintiff-purchaser 
claimed the computer vendor had made at least one misrepresentation 
in its written proposal given to the plaintiff before it signed the sales 
contract.76 The court ruled the allegation was not a basis for a fraud 
action,77 quoting from Harris v. Delco Products, Inc. 78 the general 
principle that "the law refuses to permit recovery in tort for damages 
resulting from reliance upon false statements of belief, of conditions to 
exist in the future, or of matters promissory in nature."79 The court 
also noted the exception mentioned in Harris for statements made by a 
party in a "fiduciary capacity."80 
74. See R. BIGELOW, CoNTRACTING FOR CoMPUTER HARDWARE, SOFI'WARE, 
AND SERVICES, § 4.01 et. seq. (1st ed. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1985). 
75. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). See also W. PROSSER & 
W. KEETON, TORTS, 727-29 (5th ed. 1984). 
76. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. 
77. Id. 
78. 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.2d 740 (1940). 
79. Id. at 365, 25 N.E.2d at 742. 
80. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. The court did not consider or discuss the possi­
bility of a fiduciary relationship. Other plaintiffs have tried to carry this idea of the com­
puter vendor as a fiduciary party to a higher level by alleging a separate cause of action for 
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Four years later in Black, the plaintiff-purchaser alleged that the 
vendor's representatives made a number of pre-sales misrepresenta­
tions regarding the vendor's abilities to produce and support a com­
plete working computer system. 81 While acknowledging the general 
principle quoted from Harris above, the court in Black cited two other 
Massachusetts cases,82 one decided before Westfield,83 and one after­
wards,84 for the evolving proposition that: "'where parties to the 
transaction are not on equal footing but where one has or should have 
superior knowledge concerning the matters to which the representa­
tions relate,' representations as to future events may be actionable."85 
In Westfield and Black, we thus have two courts which consid­
ered the issue of fraudulent misrepresentations in a computer acquisi­
tion case, and reached different results. Is the law in Massachusetts 
still unsettled in this area? A closer reading of both cases demon­
strates that this is probably not the case. 
C. Westfield' A Difficult Case 
Although it is unclear, the only alleged misrepresentation by the 
defendant considered by the court in Westfield86 appeared in the Bur­
roughs' pre-sale proposal to the effect that, by obtaining defendant's 
computer system, the plaintiff would realize a "substantial man-hour 
savings"87 in its business operations. The court decided the statement 
was not fraudulent. 88 In reaching this decision, the court referred to 
defendant's affidavit that the statement in the proposal depended on a 
number of outside factors such as the efficiency of the plaintiff's opera-
computer professional malpractice. However, thus far these claims have met with little 
success. See Rick's Furniture Distributing Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 3-82-0770-H (N.D. 
Tx. September 7, 1984) and other cases cited therein. 
81. Black, ApPENDIX B at 555. 
82. Id. at 564. Inexplicably, while citing Westfield earlier in its opinion for other 
propositions, the Black court made no attempt to distinguish its holding on plaintiff's count 
for fraudulent misrepresentation from the Westfield holding on the same issue. 
83. Cellucciv. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974), affd, 368 
Mass. 811, 331 N.E.2d 813 (1975). 
84. Gopen v. American Supply Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 342,407 N.E.2d 1255 (1980). 
85. Black, ApPENDIX B at 564 (quoting Gopen v. American Supply Co., 10 Mass. 
App. 342, 345,407 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (1980); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. 722, 
730, 370 N.E.2d 919, 924 (1974)). 
86. The court quoted one specific representation from plaintiff's answers to interrog­
atories alleged to have been made by defendant's employee. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. 
The court did not specifically state, however, whether this was the only misrepresentation 
claimed by plaintiff or whether this was just an example of the type of misrepresentations 
that plaintiff had alleged. 
87. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. 
88. Id. 
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tors in operating the system, the "caliber" of electrical current sup­
plied to the computer, and the plaintiff's anticipated volume of 
business to be processed.89 Since such matters were "related to future 
performances [and] not susceptible of actual knowledge,"90 there was 
no deceit. Furthermore, Judge Greaney ruled that since the plaintiff 
knew that the defendant's future performance depended on these 
outside factors, it could not have reasonably relied on the defendant's 
statements.91 In granting the defendant's motion for summary judg­
ment with respect to the fraud count, the court cited liberally from the 
Harris case: 
When a representation relates to a matter not susceptible of per­
sonal knowledge, it cannot be considered as anything more than a 
strong expression of opinion, notwithstanding it is made positively 
and as of the maker's own knowledge. The mere fact that it is 
stated positively cannot make it a statement of fact. The most any­
one can do as to such matters is to express his opinion. It cannot be 
found, from the single fact that such a statement is untrue, that it 
was made with fraudulent intent; there must also be evidence that 
the maker knew it was in some respect untrue, before there is any­
thing to submit to the jury. 92 
In Harris, the defendant-well-digger induced the plaintiff-land­
owner to hire defendant to drill a well through repeated assurances 
that the defendant would definitely not strike salt water.93 When the 
defendant struck salt water and not fresh water, the plaintiff sued, 
claiming fraud. The court rejected this claim, stating that the plaintiff 
had to have known at the time the statements were made that no one 
could tell what was below the surface of the plaintiff's land until the 
hole was actually dug and the water tested.94 
Regardless of whether the Westfield court's reliance on Harris 
was justified, one wonders whether other facts may have existed in 
Westfield that might have prevented it from being analogized to Har­
ris. The opinion does not indicate that the plaintiff produced any evi­
dence that defendant Burroughs: (1) could have reasonably predicted 
the probable performance level of Westfield's employees in operating 
the Burroughs system (given certain training they would receive from 
Burroughs), and (2) had inquired of, and did obtain from the plaintiff, 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 552. 
92. Id. at 551-52 (emphasis in original). 
93. Harris, 305 Mass. at 363, 25 N.E.2d at 741. 
94. Id. at 365, 25 N.E.2d at 742. 
543 1985) PERFORMANCE CLAIMS 
a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's anticipated business growth. If 
so, the plaintiff might well have argued that Burroughs' man-hour sav­
ings prediction was within Burroughs' actual knowledge and, there­
fore, could be relied upon. That being the case, the court might not 
have held that Harris was controlling. Additionally, issues as to mate­
rial fact would have been raised, and summary judgment presumably 
would not have been granted.9s 
On the other hand, the ruling in Westfield may have been reached 
because the plaintiff simply did not have a case to support an action in 
deceit. In other words, the strength of the facts to be presented were 
not sufficient to elevate the case from one of mere sales puffing to one 
in which a genuine issue offraud existed.96 If this were true, then the 
ruling in Westfield may have been right, although for the wrong rea­
sons. Based on the facts presented, Westfield may well be another il­
lustration of the adage "hard cases make bad law." 
Nevertheless, from a computer user's viewpoint, a disturbing 
finding in Westfield is the court's implication (admittedly unclear) that 
because the alleged misstatement made by Burroughs appeared in a 
pre-sales proposal and effectively disclaimed in the sales contract,97 
the plaintiff was precluded from alleging a cause of action based on 
tortious misrepresentation.98 At least one other court has cited West­
field for this proposition, albeit in dicta. 99 But if such were the case, 
any claim for fraud based on statements made by a vendor during the 
negotiation stage could be precluded simply by having the customer 
sign a sales agreement with a standard integration clause. lOO 
95. See MASS. R. CIV; P. 56(c). 
96. Frye Shoe Co. v. Williams, 312 Mass. 656,46 N.E.2d 1 (1942). 
97. Westfield, ApPENDIX A at 551. The contract signed by the parties contained a 
standard integration clause. Id. at 548. 
98. Id. at 552-53. Judge Greaney stated, "Other courts have held that the same 
Burroughs contract barred similar claims couched in the language of fraud and deceit 
where the claims were 'essentially' contract claims." Id. (citing Investors Premium Corp. 
v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974». In Investors Premium, however, plain­
tiff-purchaser based its deceit claim on defendant's misrepresentation that one computer 
could handle all of the plaintifrs needs. 389 F. Supp. at 42. However, instead of buying 
defendant's system in reliance on this misstatement, plaintiff leased a system, discovered for 
itself that one system would not do the job, and then purchased two systems. Id. at 41. The 
court concluded that by its own actions, plaintiff had conclusively shown that it had not 
relied on defendant's misrepresentation since it had bought two systems, and therefore the 
merger clause in the contract for those systems effectively prevented the plaintiff from rais­
ing its fraud count. Id. at 46. 
99. See Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.IO (5th Cir. 
1980) ("We in any event feel that the misrepresentation claim is in essence a contract­
related claim and thus redundant and impermissible"). Id. 
100. Even Judge Freedman appears to be leaning in this direction early in his analy­
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D. Black: Better Facts and a Different Interpretation 
In Black, the basis of the plaintiff-purchaser's fraud claim in­
volved a series of alleged misrepresentations made by the defendant 
Burroughs about the design, development, and capabilities of its com­
puter system. 101 The court acknowledged the general rule that Massa­
chusetts law "refuses to permit recovery in tort for damage resulting 
from reliance upon false statements of belief, of conditions to exist in 
the future, or of matters promissory in nature." 102 However, the court 
distinguished the instant case from this rule by holding that Burroughs 
had, or should have had, superior knowledge with respect to its own 
computer systems and thus to the misstatements it was alleged to have 
. made.103 It further explained: 
As a company engaged in the sale of computer systems, Burroughs 
must be considered to have superior knowledge about available 
hardware and software and their capabilities. While it is true that 
the future performance of obligations under a contract is often a 
matter of conjecture at the time written agreements are executed, 
misrepresenting one's own ability to perform, that is, inducing a 
party to enter into a contract by claiming the present ability to per­
form certain obligations, may rise to the level of fraudulent misrep­
sis of plaintiff's tort claim. See Black, ApPENDIX B at 565, stating: "the claim alleged 
appears to be no more than a redundant effort to recover in tort for breach of contract, for 
the specific misrepresentations set forth closely relate to the performance contemplated by 
the [sales] [a]greements ...." Id. In fairness, it could be argued that the Westfield court 
was persuaded to bar plaintiff's tort claim not so much on grounds of duplication of the 
contract counts, but more because Burroughs' agent's representations were part of the pre­
sales proposal. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Cf, APLications, Inc. v. Hew­
lett-Packard Co., 672 F.2d 1076, 1077 (2d Cir. 1982) (buyer's reliance on defendant's mis­
representations not justified because buyer was more knowledgeable in field of computer 
science than defendant's agents). 
101. Black, ApPENDIX B at 564. The court recounted those alleged misrepresenta­
tives as follows: 
(a) 	 the defendant would install a new and complete computer system (B-800) 
with capabilities to handle all information and processing that the plaintiff 
was currently undertaking, with appropriate capacity for future expansion as 
well as capability for "Newstand" plug-in, accounting and payables; 
(b) 	 Software would be handled as part of the contract either by the defendant or 
sub-contracted by the defendant to the specifications of the plaintiff, in con­
sultation with and to the complete satisfaction of the plaintiff; 
(c) 	 The defendant would provide all necessary back-up and support for twelve 
months after the commencement of the program; 
(d) 	 The defendant would send several of its representatives to the plaintiff's 
place of business prior to the execution of the subject agreements to deter­
mine the specific needs of the plaintiffs. 
Id. 
102. Id. (citing Loughery v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mass. 172, 175 (1927». 
103. Id. at 565. 
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resentation actionable in tort. 104 
Because material issues of fact existed regarding whether Burroughs 
had the present ability to deliver the system which it had represented 
to the plaintiff it could deliver, Judge Freedman denied Burrough's 
motion for summary judgment on the fraud action. 105 
In reaching this decision, the court relied heavily on the Cellucci 
v. Sun Oil Co. 106 and Gopen v. American Supply Co., Inc. 107 cases, both 
decided by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. In Cellucci, the plain­
tiff-landowner wished to sell his land to an interested third party, but 
claimed he was induced not to sell the property by the defendant's 
agent's oral statements that the defendant absolutely intended to buy 
the land and had exclusive rights to buy it. 108 When the defendant 
ultimately refused to purchase the property, the plaintiff sued for spe­
cific performance and the defendant claimed the statute of frauds de­
fense. 109 In holding the defendant should be estopped from asserting 
this defense, the Massachusetts Appeals Court recognized the "supe­
rior knowledge"lIO exception to the general rule that "representations 
as to future events are not actionable." 11 1 Further clarifying matters, 
it added, "a prediction that Sunoco will sign a contract is not like a 
prediction as to the weather. It lies within the entire and exclusive 
control of Sunoco."112 
Likewise, in Gopen, the Massachusetts Appeals Court found that 
misrepresentations regarding the future net worth of a subsidiary cor­
poration made by an attorney representing both the parent and subsid­
iary to the plaintiff-lessees were actionable in fraud. JI3 In addition to 
citing the above passages from Cellucci, the court stated that "the ex­
tent of the assets of the corporation was a matter susceptible of actual 
104. [d. 
105. Id. 
106. 2 Mass. App. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974), affd, 368 Mass. 811, 331 N.E.2d 813 
(1975). 
107. 10 Mass. App. 342, 407 N.E.2d 1255 (1980). 
108. 2 Mass. App. at 725-26, 320 N.E.2d at 921-22. 
109. [d. at 727, 320 N.E.2d at 923. 
110. Id. at 730, 320 N.E.2d at 924. 

Ill. Id. The Cellucci court recognized that plaintilrs signing of a purchase and sale 

agreement was nothing more than an offer which the defendant did not accept. Id. at 727, 
320 N.E.2d at 923 (1974). Nevertheless, because defendant's agent misled the plaintiff into 
thinking the defendant would accept the offer, and the plaintiff relied on that misrepresen­
tation to his detriment, the court held the defendant was estopped from denying acceptance 
of the offer. 
112. Id. (emphasis added). 
113. [d. 10 Mass. App. at 345-46, 407 N.E.2d at 1257. 
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knowledge and was not a matter of opinion." 114 
E. A Closer Analysis 
When read in light of the Cellucci and Gopen cases, the reasoning 
in Black appears persuasive and fair. As a developer of sophisticated 
computer systems, Burroughs, in making statements to Black that it 
intended to deliver a computer system with certain capabilities, must 
be viewed as one with superior knowledge lIS and control over such 
predictions. 116 In other words, Burroughs must be viewed as the party 
with actual knowledge of such statements. 117 Black's allegations that 
such statements were fraudulently made and that it relied on these 
promises by Burroughs were held sufficient to have this issue 
presented to the jury.I1S 
Although the decision in Westfield was made before the Gopen 
case was decided, the court's reliance on Harris, to the exclusion of 
Cellucci, seems misplaced. Moreover, while plainti1rs allegation of 
fraud in Westfield did not concern a statement by Burroughs regard­
ing the operating capabilities of its system per se (as was true in Black), 
one can argue the statement did describe indirectly, if not directly, the 
performance capabilities of Burroughs' system. Although Burroughs' 
predictions regarding the number of man-hours Westfield would save 
with its system involved factors not exclusively under its control, the 
114. ld. at 345, 407 N.E.2d 1257. 
115. Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474, 484 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding defendant liable for fraud, the court acknowledged that while 
plaintiffs principal had prior experience with computers, "this is a dynamically growing 
industry, [plaintiffs] reliance ... was reasonable"). ld. But see APLications, Inc. v. Hew­
lett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(plaintiff was much more knowledgeable than defendant's representatives to rely on their 
statements and sales brochures). 
116. A similar theory was espoused by Judge William W. Schwarzer in the cele­
brated case of The Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., No. C-79-3393-WWS (N.D. Cal. 
1981). See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
117. See Dunn Appraisal v. Honeywell Information Sys., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 
1982) (affirming judgment against defendant in action alleging fraudulent misrepresenta­
tion). In Dunn, defendant's agents represented defendant's computer was "best suited" for 
plaintiffs operation and projected business expansion. In rejecting defendant's arguments 
that such statements were opinions about the future, the court said: "General representa­
tions that data processing equipment will be suitable for a customer's operations, based 
upon familiarity with both the equipment's capabilities and the customer's needs, are state­
ments concerning present facts." ld. at 882. 
118. See also AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., No. 80 Civ. 
5710 (DDB) (S.D.N.Y. October 26, 1982) (defendant's summary judgment on plaintiffs 
count for fraudulent inducement denied). But see APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982). 
1985] PERFORMANCE CLAIMS 547 
same is true of any statement by a vendor predicting the performance 
of its product that is operated or used by human hands. 
In today's world, predictions by computer vendors regarding the 
performance of their machines in selected industries are done rou­
tinely and can be very accurate, even given the factor of human inter­
vention (which is usually incorporated into a vendor's calculations). 
Certainly such forecasts are not nearly as unpredictable as a weather 
forecast or the composition of water in a subterranean well. There can 
be no doubt that computer vendors intend and expect prospective 
users to rely on their predictions. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Both Black and Westfield were decided on motions for summary 
judgment. The difference between the two may well have been the 
quality of affidavits and evidence available to the plaintiff's counsel. 
Perhaps Westfield was just a hard case because it contained murky 
facts or facts insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim. It is unfortu­
nate that the Westfield court did not discuss Cellucci; understandably, 
its applicability may not have been as apparent in 1977 as it was in 
1981. With the decision in Black, however, many claims of deceit or 
fraudulent misrepresentation by a dissatisfied computer user which are 
based on alleged misrepresentations made by a vendor concerning its 
system's capabilities and/or future performance should survive a ven­
dor's summary judgment motion. 
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ApPENDIX At 
WESTFIELD CHEMICAL CORP. V. BURROUGHS CORP. 
Massachusetts Superior Court, Hampden County, April 15, 1977 

Civil Action No. 134475 

GREANEY, J. This is a suit brought by Westfield Chemical Cor­
poration against Burroughs Corporation alleging breach of contract 
and breach of express and implied warranties, fraud and negligence in 
connection with the manufacture, sale and servicing of a Burroughs 
computer. 
On January 28, 1971 the parties entered into a written equipment 
sales contract,1 a copy of which is appended to the affidavits. In that 
contract the seller, Burroughs Corporation, warranted that the equip­
ment was free from defects in material and workmanship and agreed 
to exchange any defective equipment for a period of one year from 
delivery. However, the contract expressly and conspicuously dis­
claimed all express or implied warranties, including any for 
merchantability or fitness. It also provided that the entire obligation 
of the seller in connection with the transaction was contained in the 
contract. 
The plaintiff alleges an express warranty by the defendant that the 
computer would generate efficiency and time savings and was fit for 
the plaintitrs account system (Declaration, Count I); an implied war­
ranty that the system was fit for the particular use to which it was put 
by the plaintiff (Declaration, Count III); and a contractual agreement 
by the defendant to assemble, program, maintain, and service the 
equipment (Declaration, Count II). The plaintiff also asserts claims 
that are expressed in tort language, but the underlying allegations in 
those claims are virtually identical with the assertions contained in the 
t Reprinted with pennission from 21 UCC Rep. Servo 1293, published by Callaghan 
& Company, 3201 Old Glenview Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091. The footnotes herein are 
reprinted as they appear in 21 UCC Rep. Servo 1293. 
1. On the same date, the parties also signed a separate "Application Software Sup­
port Contract." The plaintiff at times seems to claim damages caused by an alleged delay
in completing the programming called for under this contract, more particularly the so­
called "batch ticket program." (Declaration, Count II; Plaintitrs Answers to Interrogato­
ries Propounded by the Defendant, Answers 4(b), (c), 13, and 14(b).) 
Any such claim is barred by the provisions of that contract which also limits liability 
and disclaims warranties and representations. But even if these disclaimers and limitations 
were held ineffective in the circumstances of this case, the most that the plaintiff could 
recover would be its reasonable damages caused by any alleged delay in the delivery of the 
program. He cannot thereby acquire any rights to recover for defective machinery, mainte­
nance or repair services covered by the other contract. 
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warranty counts. (Declaration, Count IV [negligence], Count V 
[fraudulent inducement]). 
This case was heard before the court on March 23, 1977, pursu­
ant to the defendant's motion under Mass R Civ P 56 for summary 
judgment. From an examination of the evidentiary material submit­
ted, as well as the issues raised during oral argument, and the briefs, I 
find that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and 
that the defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 
First, I find that the disclaimer of implied and express warranties 
contained in the contract complies with OLc 106, §1-201(1O) and is 
conspicuous. I also find that the disclaimer is valid and effective so as 
to disclaim all warranties express or implied pursuant to OLc 106, §2­
316, and to therefore determine any rights that the plaintiff has to re­
cover for claimed breach of warranties. Other courts have held that 
identical language in contracts of the defendant in use in other states 
has effectively disclaimed all express and implied warranties. Bakal·v. 
Burroughs Corp., 343 NYS2d 541, 74 Misc2d 202 [13 UCC Rep 60] 
(1972); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., Civil No. 72­
1526 (DSC Feb. 1, 1974). See, OLe 106, §2-719, Official UCC Com­
ment 3 (discussing unconscionability) ("The seller in all cases is free to 
disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316."). The 
Investors Premium Corp. decision, not a decision of record * though 
thoroughly in point here, is attached to defendant's brief, and covers 
issues germane to those present in this case. 
I also find that the plaintiff and the defendant validly agreed upon 
a limitation of damages as governed by OLe 106, §2-719, and that the 
defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law on any claim for 
damages other than replacement or repair of defective parts of the 
computer. 
The contract in issue here provides: 
"Seller shall deliver, install and service the equipment as promptly 
as is reasonably possible, but shall not be held responsible for delay 
in delivery, installation or service, nor in any event under this agree­
ment for more than an exchange of equipment under its warranty, 
upon return of the equipment to the seller, with seller's prior writ­
ten consent. (Purchaser hereby expressly waives all damages, 
whether direct, incidental or consequential.)" 
OLe 106, §2-719(1) specifically provides that "the agreement may. 
limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, 
• [The court is in error. The decision referred to was reported in 389 F Supp 39 as 
well as in 17 vee Rep llS.-ED.]. 
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as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repay­
ment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming 
goods or parts ..." The purpose of this provision is to leave the 
parties "free to shape their remedies to their particular requirements 
and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be 
given effect." GLc 106, §2-719, Official UCC Comment 1. 
GLc 106, §2-719(3) provides: 
"Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the lim­
itation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential 
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is 
prima facie unconscionable but limitation ofdamage where the loss 
is commercial is not." (Emphasis added.) 
This agreement is not unconscionable. "The principle [of uncon­
scionability] is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise 
. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power." GLc 106, §2-302, Official UCC Comment 1. The 
majority of contracts held unconscionable have been in the area of 
consumer transactions. E.g., Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F2d 445 [2 UCC Rep 955] (DC Cir 1965), and this contract is 
between businessmen acting at presumed arms length. 
Nor has the limited remedy provided by this contract failed of its 
essential purpose. At any time the plaintiff could have returned any 
defective part for repair or replacement. Compare Wilson Trading 
Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 NY2d 398, 244 NE2d 685, 297 
NYS2d 108 [5 UCC Rep 1213] (1968) (remedy fails of its essential 
purpose where time for reporting defect was shorter than time reason­
ably necessary to discover it). 
I also find that the contract makes it clear that the seller will 
provide maintenance coverage for twelve months at no additional cost, 
but shall not be liable for damages or losses in the rendering of that 
maintenance. Under these circumstances, the absence of any claim 
that the seller did not in fact offer "as well trained and competent a 
staff of service technicians as are available in the industry," the plain­
tiff cannot recover for damages allegedly caused by delays in rendering 
of maintenance coverage, and this entitles the defendant to judgment 
on Count II alleging breach of the maintenance contract. 
Furthermore, I find that any alleged misrepresentation concern­
ing the function of the computer related to future performances not 
susceptible of actual knowledge and cannot serve as a basis for recov­
ery in fraud. See, Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 305 Mass 362. The 
plaintiff is, therefore, barred by GLc 106, §2-202 from introducing evi­
551 1985] PERFORMANCE CLAIMS 
dence as to alleged representations made by the seller during the sale 
negotiations, particularly in view of the clause in the contract limiting 
the entire obligation of the parties to what appears in the written 
agreement. The mere characterization of representations as "fraudu­
lent" is insufficient to take them out of the general rule that one is 
bound by the terms of the written agreement, whether he reads and 
understands it or not. See Conney v. New England Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 353 Mass 158. 
Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., supra, in point here on the fraud 
claims, provides that: 
"It is well settled in this Commonwealth that the charge of fraudu­
lent intent, in an action for deceit, may be maintained by proof of a 
statement made, as of the party's own knowledge, which is false, 
provided the thing stated is not a matter of opinion, estimate, or 
judgment, but is susceptible of exact knowledge . . . Representa­
tions, although false, concerning matters not susceptible of actual 
knowledge have been held to be nonactionable, at least when made 
by one not in a fiduciary capacity. . . and it is a general rule that 
the law refuses to permit recovery in tort for damages resulting 
from reliance upon false statements of belief, of conditions to exist 
in the future, or of matters promissory in nature." 
This test applies as well to contract actions. Id., at 364. 
Any representations made by the defendant here necessarily re­
lated to the future. The plaintiff, when asked to given particulars con­
cerning misrepresentations made by the defendant has insured m 
interrogatories: 
"(a) One such warranty was conveyed by Burroughs proposal 
date 14 September 1970 signed by Richard Carlson, the substance 
of which was a substantial man-hour savings. The savings never 
materialized, and, in fact, operating time exceeded man-hours origi­
nally performed manually by Westfield Chemical Corporation." 
Plaintitrs Answers to Interrogatories Propounded by the Defend­
ant, Answers 21, 14. 
As is apparent from the affidavit of Julius J. Samal, appended to de­
fendant's motion for summary judgment, man-hour savings are depen­
dent upon such variables as the program actually decided upon, the 
cooperation and the efficiency of the operators, the caliber of the elec­
trical current supplied to the computer, the volume of business being 
processed, etc., none of which were susceptible of knowledge when the 
proposal was written. 
"When a representation relates to a matter not susceptible of per­
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sonal knowledge, it cannot be considered as anything more than a 
strong expression of opinion, notwithstanding it is made positively 
and as of the maker's own knowledge. The mere fact that it is 
stated positively cannot make it a statement of fact. The most any­
one can do as to such matters is to express his opinion. It cannot be 
found, from the single fact that such a statement is untrue, that it 
was made with fraudulent intent; there must also be evidence that 
the maker knew it was in some respect untrue, before there is any­
thing to submit to the jury." (Emphasis added.) Harris v. Delco 
Products, Inc., supra, at 366 (1940). 
Furthermore, as a matter of law the plaintiff could not have reason­
ably relied upon such representations. Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 
supra. 
"... Regardless of what has been said about the matter, or of how 
strongly the statement has been put, he knows that the speaker can­
not actually know what the fact of the matter is, and that, therefore, 
he is not justified in relying on what can, in its nature, be nothing 
more than the opinion, however strong, of the speaker on the mat­
ter." Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., supra, at 367. 
This is particularly true where, as here, any statements were made 
during the early planning stages. Compare Yerid v. Mason, 341 Mass 
527 (1960) with Pietrazak v. McDermott, 341 Mass 107 (1960) (stage 
of completion distinguishing factor where defendants represented that 
cellars would be dry). 
Moreover, the letter dated September 14, 1970 from Richard 
Carlson clearly states: 
"This recommendation of Burroughs products is submitted for your 
consideration and guidance only in the hope that we may be favored 
with your order. Since this proposal is preliminary only, the order 
when issued shall constitute the only legally binding commitment of 
the parties." (Emphasis added). 
It should also be noted that this is not a case where the nature of 
the thing being sold was misrepresented, City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 
232 Ga 766, 208 SE2d 794 [15 VCC Rep 598] (1974) (dealer repre­
sented to consumer that car had never been previously owned), or the 
nature of the contract being signed was kept from the plaintiff. Com­
pare Schell v. Ford Motor Co., 270 F2d 384 (1st Cir 1959) (applying 
Massachusetts law) (consumer not barred from suing where release 
saying no representations had been made was characterized as a pass 
to enter the plant). Other courts have held that the same Burroughs 
contract barred similar claims couched in the language of fraud and 
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deceit where the claims were "essentially" contract claims. E.g., In­
vestors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., supra. 
In summary, the breach of warranty counts fail because of the 
existence of a complete, conspicuous and valid disclaimer. 
The breach of contract count fails because of the limitation of 
damage clause in the contract which is valid and enforceable and is 
not claimed to have been breached. 
The count claiming fraud fails on the authority of Harris v. Delco 
Products Inc., supra, which I find controls this claim based on the 
materials submitted. 
Finally, the negligent manufacture count fails since it is basically 
a duplicate of the warranty and contract counts and hence barred by 
the agreement, and since nothing has been indicated factually to show 
any triable issue on the negligent manufacture claim. 
On the basis of the foregoing, I find this to be an appropriate case 
for a Rule 56 motion and summary judgment to be entered for the 
defendant on all counts. 
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ApPENDIX Bt 
SAMUEL BLACK CO. v. BURROUGHS CORP. 
United States District Court, District of Massachusetts 

December 18, 1981 

Civil Action No. 78-30777-F 

MEMORANDUM 
FREEDMAN, D.J. 
Defendant and third-party plaintiff Burroughs Corporation 
("Burroughs") filed a motion for summary judgment "on its behalf as 
against plaintiff Samuel Black Company" ("Black") which was re­
ferred to a Magistrate. The Magistrate determined that genuine issues 
of material fact remained to be resolved and thus recommended that 
Burroughs' motion be denied. Burroughs seasonably objected to the 
Recommendation of the Magistrate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires 
that I make a de novo determination of those portions of the Magis­
trate's Recommendation to which objection is made, and permits me 
to "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part," the Recommendation 
of the Magistrate. [d. 
While Burroughs' objections were pending, Black moved to 
amend its complaint and subsequently moved to reopen discovery for 
the limited purpose of filing an additional set of interrogatories and a 
request for production of documents. Burroughs has filed oppositions 
to Black's motions. 
In this Memorandum, I address Burroughs' objections to the 
Magistrate's Recommendation and Black's motions. For the reasons 
stated herein, I am today. entering orders modifying the Recommenda­
tion of the Magistrate by granting Burroughs' motion for summary 
judgment as to Count I of Black's complaint against it, but adopting 
the Magistrate's Recommendation of denial with respect to Counts II 
and III. I will also grant Black's motion to amend its complaint by 
adjusting the damages sought in Counts II and III and by adding a 
new Count IV. However, I will deny Black's motion to reopen discov­
ery for the limited purposes requested. 
II. 
Plaintiff Black is a Massachusetts business trust with a principal 
place of business in West Springfield, Massachusetts, and is engaged, 
t Reprinted verbatim from the slip opinion. All subsequent footnotes were provided 
by the court. 
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inter alia, in the wholesale distribution of newspapers, magazines, and 
paperback books. Lewis A. Black is a trustee of and owner of all the 
beneficial interest in the Black business trust. The instant litigation 
arises out of a computer system transaction, whereby Black agreed to 
purchase for substantial sums of money a sophisticated computer sys­
tem from Burroughs, a Michigan Corporation with a principal place 
of business in that state and a regional branch office in Springfield, 
Massachusetts. 
In early 1977, Black was actively considering whether to install 
an in-house computer system adaptable to its then current and future 
business needs. At the time, Black was utilizing a computer service 
bureau in Tampa, Florida, and apparently thought certain efficiencies 
and improvements would be achieved by changing over to an in-house 
system. 
Among several computer systems soliciting Black's business was 
Burroughs, the agents of which approached Black and through an ex­
tended course of discussions and negotiations formulated a written 
proposal for the delivery and installation of a sophisticated computer 
system suitable to Black's business needs. In his affidavit, Lewis A. 
Black states that "Agents of the Burroughs Corporation explicitly told 
me ... that Burroughs had the present capability to make opera­
tional such a [sophisticated] system ... [and that Black] would have 
an operational system on or before December 1, 1977." Affidavit of 
Lewis A. Black, at 2. While deposition testimony of employees and 
former employees of Burroughs to a lesser or greater extent contra­
dicts the fact and nature of the representations made to Black by Bur­
roughs' agents, see, e.g. Deposition of Nicholas Lentino, Volume I, at 
39-45, Lewis Black states in his affidavit that "Because of these repre­
sentations, I, on behalf of the Samuel Black Company, executed an 
agreement on or about August 25, 1977, at West Springfield, Massa­
chusetts wherein [Black] agreed to purchase the subject computer sys­
tem." Affidavit of Lewis A. Black, at 2. 
In fact, three written agreements were executed by the parties on 
August 25, 1977 ("August Agreements"). Detailed discussion of the 
terms and conditions of these agreements is postponed to an ensuing 
section. 1 It suffices to note here that all three were standard Bur­
roughs forms, one being a Burroughs Agreement for Equipment Sale, 
the other two being Burroughs Software and Support Agreements. 
Affidavit of Francis Dibble, Esq., Appendices 1, 2, and 3. Although 
the parties subsequently executed additional written agreements and 
1. See Part IV, A, infra. 
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made adjustments in the price of the computer hardware, see id., Ap­
pendices 4, 5, 6, and 7, the August Agreements established the basic 
contractual relationship between the parties and provided for the sale, 
delivery, and installation of both computer hardware and software. 
From Black's point of view, with the benefit of hindsight, the deal 
quickly soured. There is no dispute that the computer hardware was 
delivered in late December 1977, and, while there is some disagree­
ment on this point, the hardware seemed to be in working order. 
There is also no dispute that the software for the Black computer sys­
tem never did arrive at Black's place of business. Thus, Black never 
got a functioning computer system. 
Little purpose would be served by attempting to present the con­
flicting accounts in affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and deposi­
tion testimony as to why the software was never delivered. Briefly 
stated, there is evidence that Burroughs intended to purchase suitable 
software from a Pennsylvania company, but this plan was aban­
doned-although it is not clear whether the plan was abandoned 
before or after the execution of the August Agreements. Further, 
there is testimony that illness prevented certain Burroughs personnel 
from completing the design and creation of the specific software neces­
sary for the proper functioning of the contemplated computer system. 
What is clear is the fact that Burroughs prevailed upon Black to agree 
to extensions of time for Burroughs' performance, initially to the 
Spring of 1978, and thereafter to November 1, 1978. It is at this junc­
ture, that is, when problems arose in securing suitable software, that 
Computer Assistance, Incorporated ("CAl"), a Connecticut Corpora­
tion with a principal place of business in West Hartford, Connecticut, 
became involved with the Burroughs-Black transaction. 
According to answers to interrogatories filed by CAl, Burroughs 
in February 1978 sub-contracted the work of studying Black's 
software needs to CAl. Burroughs and CAl apparently reached two 
oral agreements; first, that CAl for payment of $900.00 would conduct 
a study to determine the cost of developing a complete order process­
ing system for the Samuel Black Company; second, for payment of 
$32,000.00, CAl would develop a complete order processing system at 
Samuel Black Company by November 1, 1978. See CAl's Answers to 
Interrogatories of Burroughs, at 4-5. The exact date of these agree­
ments is the subject of conflicting deposition testimony, but there 
seems to be no dispute that oral agreements were made. 
During the Spring of 1978, Black and Burroughs executed addi­
tional equipment and software agreements. CAl began its work at 
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Black's place of business, but experienced some difficulty meeting 
deadlines because of the illness of one of its personnel. Black's increas­
ing concern for the completion of the software grew to exasperation 
with the performance of Burroughs and CAl, and Black through its 
attorneys wrote a letter to Burroughs dated August 19, 1978, in part 
as follows: 
You are hereby advised that effective immediately, Samuel Black 
Company hereby cancels any and all Agreements which it may have 
had with Burroughs, and shall look to Burroughs for any and all 
damages including loss of profits which result from Burroughs' ac­
tions in regard to said Agreements. Moreover, you are further ad­
vised that Samuel Black Company considers the misrepresentations 
made by agents of Burroughs with reference to the commencement 
of the system operation to be an unfair or deceptive practice as de­
clared unlawful by Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A in 
that but for the said misrepresentations, Samuel Black Company 
would not have entered into the subject Agreement. 
Complaint, Count I, ~ 4, and Exhibit C. Thereafter, Black made the 
computer hardware in its possession available to Burroughs for pick­
up and the equipment was returned to Burroughs on September 28, 
1978. 
Black filed suit against Burroughs in state court in November 
1978 alleging three counts: first, a claim for breach of contract; sec­
ond, a claim for knowing and wilful violation of M.G.L. c. 93A; and 
third, a claim for tortious misrepresentation. Burroughs removed to 
this Court alleging diversity and an amount in controversy greater 
than $10,000.00, see 28 U.S.c. § 1441(a), answered interposing several 
defenses, and counterclaimed against Black for amounts owing under 
the contracts between the parties. Burroughs subsequently filed a 
third-party complaint against CAl, alleging breach of contract in two 
counts for CAl's failure to perform the oral agreements for design dif­
fer so substantially that this Court is satisfied that there are indeed 
questions of material fact to be determined in this case.") While I am 
in agreement with the ultimate conclusion of the Magistrate with re­
spect to Counts II and III of Black's complaint against Burroughs, my 
de novo review of the entire factual record convinces me that Bur­
roughs is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the complaint. 
IV. 
I will address the three counts of Black's complaint in light of 
Burroughs' motion and the undisputed factual record as follows: first, 
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the contract claim; second, the claim for tortious misrepresentation; 
and finally, the claim under Chapter 93A. 
A. Contract 
There is no genuine dispute that Black and Burroughs executed a 
series of written agreements, all standard Burroughs forms, the most 
important of which were the Agreement for Equipment Sale ("AES") 
and the two Software and Support Agreements ("SSA") signed by rep­
resentatives of the parties on August 25, 1977. All subsequent agree­
ments executed by the parties relate to the performance set forth in the 
. August Agreements, and, with the exception of a letter of understand­
ing adjusting the contract amount, are all on identical Burroughs 
forms. 2 Furthermore, there is no genuine dispute concerning the ex­
tensions of time for performance agreed to by Black, albeit reluctantly, 
which made Burroughs' performance due on November 1, 1978. 
Given these two undisputed material facts, that is, the existence of the 
written agreements and a subsequent agreement as to time of perform­
ance, I conclude that Burroughs is entitled to summary judgment on 
Black's contract claims against it. 
The AES provides for the sale of a B-800 computer by Burroughs 
to Black for a total price of $58,435.00 before adjustments for down 
payment, trade-in, and taxes. On its face, the AES states the following 
in large type: 
Any program or software . . . supplied in conjunction with this 
agreement is subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein 
and may be contained on a software and support agreement which 
is incorporated by reference. 
The agreement is signed by Nicholas Lentino on behalf of Burroughs, 
and Lewis A. Black on behalf of Black. Above Black's signature ap­
pears the following language in large type: "Customer by its signature 
acknowledges that it has read this agreement, understands it, and 
agrees to all its terms and conditions including those on the reverse 
side." The reverse side sets out detailed provisions in fifteen numbered 
clauses. 
2. An AES was executed by the parties on December 23,1977 wherein Black agreed 
to purchase a terminal display and keyboard for $3,307.50. On May 1, 1978, Black 
purchased "Accounts Receivable Custom Programming" for $8,000.00, and on June 13, 
1978 purchased "Operator Training" for $550.00. Both agreements are on SSA forms. A 
letter dated May 1, 1978 from Nicholas Lentino to Black evidences an agreement to reduce 
the original hardware contract price by $8,000.00 to adjust for the increased software price 
of $8,000.00. See Affidavit of Francis Dibble, Esq., at Appendices 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
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The SSAs executed by the parties provide for Burroughs furnish­
ing the following software: "Accounts receivable, Invoicing, Bulk 
Book and History with Complete OIR Regulation, including Mainte­
nance and Reporting Programs" for an "initial charge" of $20,000.00 
with an "Estimated Delivery Date" of January 1, 1978; and "Utilities" 
and "System Software" for an "initial charge" of $540.00 and 
$2,000.00 respectively, with an "Estimated Delivery Date" of Decem­
ber 1, 1977. On the face of these agreements appears the following in 
large type: 
Customer acknowledges by its signature that it has read this agree­
ment, understands it and that it constitutes the entire agreement, 
understanding and representations, express or implied, between the 
customer and Burroughs with respect to the program products and 
services to be furnished hereunder and that this agreement super­
sedes all prior communications between the parties including all 
oral or written proposals. This agreement may be modified or 
amended only by a written instrument signed by duly authorized 
representatives of customer and Burroughs. 
The terms and conditions, including the warranty and limitation of 
liability, on the reverse side, are part of this agreement. 
On the reverse side are fourteen numbered clauses. Both the AES and 
SSA forms provide that the laws of the State of Michigan shall govern 
the agreements. The AES in Clause 4 states in relevant part that "for 
a period of one year from shipment, the equipment shall be free from 
defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service," 
and that "Customer's sole and exclusive remedy in the event of defect 
is expressly limited to correction of the defect by adjustment, repair or 
replacement at Burroughs' election and sole expense. . . ." The SSA 
form in Clause 9 states that "Customer agrees that its sole and exclu­
sive remedy and Burroughs' sole obligation, if a Licensed Program 
warranted hereunder fails to conform to the applicable design specifi­
cations and Customer advised Burroughs of such failure in writing 
during the term of the warranty, is for Burroughs to provide program­
ming services to attempt to correct the defect." Both forms also set 
forth in type larger than that of the surrounding clauses the following 
terms: 
EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED HEREIN, THERE 

ARE NO WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED INCLUD­

ING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES 

OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICU­

LAR PURPOSE. 

IN NO EVENT SHALL BURROUGHS BE LIABLE FOR LOSS 
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OF PROFITS, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR 
OTHER SIMILAR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF BREACH 
OF THIS AGREEMENT OR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS 
AGREEMENT. 
BURROUGHS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAM­
AGES CAUSED BY DELAY IN SHIPMENT, INSTALLATION 
OR FURNISHING OF EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES UNDER 
THIS AGREEMENT. 3 
At the outset of analysis of the legal effect of these contract provi­
sions, I note that Black has not challenged the terms and conditions of 
the Burroughs standard forms on the basis of unconscionability, and 
. the precedents cited by Burroughs suggest that such a challenge would 
be fruitless. See, e.g., Earman Oil Company, Inc. v. Burroughs Corpo­
ration, 625 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Westfield Chemical 
Company v. Burroughs Corporation, 21 VCC Rep. S. 1293, 1296 
(Mass. Super. 1977). Neither has Black argued that the choice of law 
provisions of the AES and SSA do not apply to its contract claim. 
Instead, Black has vaguely4 advanced two arguments: first, that Bur­
roughs "anticipatorily breached its contractual obligations," Plaintiff's 
Memorandum of Law at 2; and second, that the exclusive remedy pro­
visions of the written agreements do not contemplate the nature of 
breach present in this case, and are thus ineffective. Id. at 5. In 
Black's view, genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved con­
cerning these issues. 
Before turning these contentions, I must consider a few prelimi­
nary matters. First, the courts of Massachusetts would give effect to 
the choice of law provisions of the written agreements, inasmuch as 
Michigan, being Burroughs' state of incorporation and the location of 
its principal place of business, bears a reasonable relationship to the 
instant transaction. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Company v. Amerotron 
Corporation, 339 Mass. 252, 257-58 (1959) (and cases cited therein); 
compare, M.G.L. c. 106 § 1-105(1) ("when a transaction bears a rea­
sonable relationship to this state and also to another state . . . the 
parties may agree that the laws of either this state or of such other 
state . . . shall govern their rights and duties . . . . "). A federal 
3. The second paragraph of this clause in the SSA form is in slightly different 
language: 

Burroughs shall not be liable for any damages caused by delay in delivery, instal­

lation or furnishing of the program product(s) and/or services under this 

agreement. 

4. Plaintiff advances these arguments in its memorandum in conclusory terms and 
without any citations to authorities. 
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court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules which the 
forum state would apply. Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manu­
facturing Company, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Therefore, I must apply 
the law of Michigan in determining the validity of the instant agree­
ments' terms and conditions and the rights and obligations of the par­
ties thereunder. 
Turning to Michigan law, I conclude that there is reason to doubt 
whether the courts of Michigan would treat the computer system 
transaction between Black and Burroughs as falling within the scope 
of its version of the Uniform Commercial Code's ("UCC") article on 
sales. s See Wells v. 1O-X Manufacturing Company, 609 F.2d 248, 255 
(6th Cir. 1979). Clearly, both sales of goods and delivery of services 
are contemplated by the AES and SSAs and this complex transaction 
does not fit neatly within the language of UCC § 2-102; but see Note, 
Computer Programs as Goods Under the UCC, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1149 
(1979) (arguing that computer programs are analogous to phonograph 
records, the sale of which falls within the UCC's coverage). Resolu­
tion of the point is not critical, however; the UCC's provisions are 
both helpful and persuasive by analogy, and I am unaware of any ad­
vantage accruing to Black's benefit under the common law of Michi­
gan which would alter the result in this particular case. 
Both the parol evidence rule and the integration provisions of the 
AES and SSA forms would bar Black's introduction of evidence of any 
prior or contemporaneous oral agreement between the parties not re­
flected on the face of the signed agreements. UCC § 2-202. The lan­
guage of the written agreements does not specify a date for 
performance, and time of performance is not made of the essence in 
the written agreements. Rather, the August Agreements set forth "es­
timated delivery dates" in December 1977 and January 1978. 
When time is either not mentioned or not made of the essence in a 
contract, a reasonable time for performance is inferred. UCC § 2-309; 
Reinforced Concrete Company v. Boyes, 80 Mich. 609, 147 N.W. 577 
(1914). What constitutes a reasonable time for performance would in 
most cases present a jury question, see id., but in this case, the factual 
record indicates that the parties agreed that Burroughs' performance 
would be due on November 1, 1978. Clearly, no time could be more 
5. The Michigan version of the uee is codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 440.1101-.9994., the identity of the sections of the Official Code having been preserved 
by combining the Michigan Compiled Laws chapter number with the official numbers. For 
convenience, citations are made to the Official Code numbers. 
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reasonable than that agreed upon by the parties themselves in their 
course of dealing. 
Black attempts to circumvent this point by first arguing that Bur­
roughs "anticipatorily breached" its agreement, stating that "Black 
felt that the performance . . . of Burroughs would not come to pass 
and accordingly took the position that Burroughs had breached its 
agreement to Black and that consideration for any of its extensions 
had failed." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 5. This argument is uncon­
vincing for two reasons. First, irrespective of what Black "felt" about 
the future course of performance by Burroughs and its sub-contractor 
CAl in July 1978, anticipatory repudiation is not implicated absent an 
"unequivocal declar[ation of] intent not to perform. . . ." Jackson v. 
American Gas Company, 485 F. Supp. 370, 373 (W.D. Mich. 1980) 
(applying Michigan law). The factual record contains no suggestion of 
such an "unequivocal declaration" here. Second, while I note that an 
agreement modifying a contract within the scope of Article II of the 
vee needs no consideration to be binding, vee § 2-209(1), the issue 
here is not the enforceability of or consideration given for the agree­
ment to make Burroughs' performance due on November 1, 1978; in­
stead, the fact that agreements were made provides a basis for 
determining what time for performance was reasonable under the orig­
inal August Agreements. Again, the most reasonable time is that 
agreed to by the parties themselves during performance of their obliga­
tions under the contract. 
Moreoever, the warranty disclaimer provisions of the August 
Agreements are conspicuous, mention merchantability, and are en­
forceable. vee § 2-316.6 While Black has characterized the exclu­
sive remedy of repair and replacement and limitation of liability 
clauses of the AES and SSA forms as "boilerplate," these clauses are 
in accordance with the requirements of the vee and are effective. 
vee § 2-719(1).7 Several courts confronted with identical or very 
similar contract language in Burroughs forms have reached the same 
6. This section provides in pertinent part: 
". . .[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part 
of it, the language must mention merchantability and in the case of a writing must 
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the 
exclusion must be by writing and conspicuous." 
vee § 2-316(2). 
7. The section in its entirety provides: 
(1) 	 Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section . . . 
(a) 	 the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitu­
tion for those provided in this Article [II] and may limit or alter the 
measure of damages recoverable under this Article . . . , and 
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result. Earman Oil Company v. Burroughs Corporation, supra at 1298; 
Westfield Chemical Company v. Burroughs Corporation, supra at 1295; 
Investors Premium Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation, 389 F. Supp. 
39, 45 (D. S.c. 1974). Thus, regardless of the question of breach, the 
terms of the August Agreements themselves preclude the recovery 
sought by Black in its contract claim. 
The gravamen of Black's arguments concerning these clauses, 
although not expressed in terms of art, is that the remedy provided for 
in the August Agreements fails of its essential purpose. See UCC § 2­
719(2). However, although there no doubt are circumstances where a 
limited repair and replacement remedy essentially eviscerates a con­
tract of its substance, this is not such a case. For a remedy provision 
to fail of its essential purpose, that provision must have been resorted 
to on occasion and found wanting. Here, the undisputed facts reveal 
that the time for Burroughs' final performance was November 1, 1978. 
Regardless of what rights Black may have had under UCC § 2-609 or 
its common law counterpart to demand adequate assurances of per­
formance, in August 1978 the exclusive remedy provision had not yet 
been brought into play, much less had failed of its essential purpose. 
Any repair or replacement of defective software was not implicated 
before Burroughs had rendered final performance. Black does not dis­
pute the fact that Burroughs, through its sub-contractor CAl, was at­
tempting to finalize and deliver the software necessary for the Black 
system when Black cancelled the agreements in August 1978, 
although Black was and is of the view that Burroughs would not be 
able to complete the task by November 1, 1978. Nevertheless, the ex­
clusive and limited remedies of the AES and SSA could not have failed 
of their essential purpose before they even became applicable. 
Because my de novo review of the materials submitted persuades 
me that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that Burroughs is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I of Black's com­
plaint against it, I will reject the Magistrate's Recommendation in part 
and grant Burroughs' motion for summary judgment on Count I of 
the complaint. 
(b) 	 resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex­
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy. 
(2) 	 Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its es­
sential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act. 
(3) 	 Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or 
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury 
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable 
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not. 
UCC § 2-719. 
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B. 	 Tort 
In Count III of its complaint, Black incorporates by reference the 
allegations of Count II, specifically referring to the following misrepre­
sentations allegedly made by Burroughs: 
(a) 	 the defendant would install a new and complete computer sys­
tem (B-800) with capabilities to handle all information and 
processing that the plaintiff was currently undertaking, with 
appropriate capacity for future expansion as well as capability 
for "Newstand" plug-in, accounting and payables; 
(b) 	 Software would be handled as part of the contract either by the 
defendant or sub-contracted by the defendant to the specifica­
tions of the plaintiff, in consultation with and to the complete 
satisfaction of the plaintiff. 
(c) 	 The defendant would provide all necessary back-up and sup­
port for twelve months after the commencement of the 
program; 
(d) 	 The defendant would send several of its representatives to the 
plaintiffs place of business prior to the execution of the subject 
agreements to determine the specific needs of the plaintiffs. 
Complaint, Count II, ~ 3. 
Burroughs asserts that even indulging in all inferences favorable 
to the plaintiff from the factual record, Black may not recover in tort 
for these repJ;"esentations because they are promissory in nature. Black 
counters this argument by reference to two Massachusetts Appeals 
Court cases which in Black's view hold such misrepresentations 
actionable. 
The law of Massachusetts "refuses to permit recovery in tort for 
damage resulting from reliance upon false statements of belief, of con­
ditions to exist in the future, or of matters promissory in nature." 
Laughery v. Central Trust Company, 258 Mass. 172, 175 (1927) (and 
cases cited therein). However, recent decisions of the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court have tempered this broad statement of the law and 
have applied the now familiar rule that "where parties to the transac­
tion are not on equal footing but where one has or should have supe­
rior knowledge concerning the matters to which the representations 
relate," representations as to future events may be actionable. Gopen 
v. American Supply Company, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Mass. 

App. 1980); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Company, 320 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Mass . 

. App. 1974) (both cases citing Williston, Contracts, § 1496, at 373-74 

(3d ed. 1970)). 
Cellucci involved an action for specific performance of a land sale 
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contract on a promissory estoppel theory, and the particular misrepre­
sentations at issue related to the legal significance of the execution of a 
written agreement and the likelihood of its future acceptance by a cen­
tral office. 320 N.E.2d at 924-5. In Gopen, an attorney representing 
both a parent corporation and its subsidiary represented to a lessor 
that the subsidiary corporation would have a net worth of $25,000.00. 
In reliance on this false representation, the lessor entered into a lease 
with the subsidiary corporation. Finding that the extent of the assets 
of the subsidiary "was a matter susceptible of actual knowledge and 
was not a matter of opinion," 407 N.E.2d 1255, the court held the 
representation as to future net worth actionable. Id. 
Literally read, the allegations made by Black do not seem to bring 
this case within the scope of the holdings of Cellucci or Gopen. In­
deed, the claim alleged appears to be no more than a redundant effort 
to recover in tort for breach of contract, for the specific misrepresenta­
tions set forth closely relate to the performance contemplated by the 
August Agreements. See, e.g., Earman Oil Company v. Burroughs 
Corporation, supra, at 1244, n.lO (and cases cited therein). On the 
other hand, when read in light of the evidence brought forward by 
Black in resisting Burroughs' motion, the allegations take on a differ­
ent qUality. 
As a company engaged in the sale of computer systems, Bur­
roughs must be considered to have superior knowledge about available 
hardware and software and their capabilities. While'it is true that the 
future performance of obligations under a contract is often a matter of 
conjecture at the time written agreements are execu·ted, misrepresent­
ing one's own ability to perform, that is, inducing a party to enter into 
a contract by claiming the present ability to perform certain obliga­
tions, may rise to the level of fraudulent misrepresentation actionable 
in tort. Although the question is concededly close, at this juncture I 
am persuaded that material fact issues remain as to whether Bur­
roughs induced Black to enter into the August Agreements by falsely 
representing to Black that Burroughs had the present ability to design, 
create, deliver, and install the sophisticated computer system sought 
by Black. Therefore, I will adopt the Magistrate's Recommendation 
and deny Burroughs' motion for summary judgment as to Count II of 
Black's complaint. 
C. Chapter 93A 
Under M.G.L. c. 93A, § 11, "Any person who engages in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce who suffers any loss of money or 
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property, real or personal ..." as a result of an unfair method of 
competition or unfair and deceptive act or practice declared unlawful 
by M.G.L. c. 93A § 2, may recover damages therefor, including 
double and treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs in accordance 
with the provisions of § 11. M.G.L. c. 93A § 2 provides as follows: 
(a) 	 Unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are 
hereby declared unlawful. 
(b) 	 It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph 
(a) of this section in actions brought ... ,the courts will be 
guided by the interpretation given by the Federal Trade Com­
mission and the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Fed­
eral Trade Commission Act, as from time to time amended. 
(c) The attorney general may make rules, and regulations inter­
preting the provisions of subsection 2(a) of this chapter. 
Id. 
In its complaint, and subsequently in answers to interrogatories, 
Black relies on the following regulation of the Massachusetts Attorney 
General promulgated pursuant to M.G.L. c. 93A § 2: 
An act or practice is a violation of M.G.L. c. 93A § 2 if 
Any person or other legal entity subject to this act fails to disclose 
to a buyer or prospective buyer any fact, the disclsoure of which 
may have it;tfluenced the prospective buyer not to enter into the 
transaction. 
940 Code of Massachusetts Regulations ("C.M.R.") § 3.16 (1980). 
Notwithstan~ing Burroughs' contentions that the record fails to 
substantiate the non-disclosure of any "fact" to Black, my review of 
the record convinces me that genuine issues of material fact remain 
with respect to the merits of Black's claim under Chapter 93A in 
Count III of its complaint. M.G.L. c. 93A is "a statute of broad im­
pact which creates new substantive rights and provides new proce­
dural devices for the enforcement those rights." Slaney v. Westwood 
Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 766, 772 (Mass. 1975), and the "statutory 
words '[u]nfair and deceptive practices [in M.G.L. c. 93A, § 2] are not 
limited by traditional tort and contract law requirements.''' Id. at 773 
quoting Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974). 
Deposition testimony submitted by Black clearly presents fact issues 
as to the conduct of Burroughs in the negotiation and performance of 
its written agreements with Black. 
Burroughs has argued that it is exempt from the application of 
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Chapter 93A by virtue of M.G.L. c. 93A § 3(1)(b) which provides as 
follows: 
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to . . . trade or commerce of 
any person of whose gross revenue at twenty percent is derived from 
transactions in interstate commerce, excepting however transactions 
which (i) occur primarily and substantially within the 
[C]ommonwealth [of Massachusetts] .... 
Id. Burroughs has submitted the affidavits of two of its officers8 which 
state that over twenty percent of Burroughs' gross revenue is derived 
from transactions in interstate commerce, and that the computer hard­
ware delivered to Black was manufactured in Pennsylvania. Notwith­
standing these affidavits, I am in agreement with Black that at the very 
least a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the instant 
transaction occurred primarily and substantially within Massachu­
setts.9 Furthermore, I find Burroughs' reliance on the choice of law 
provisions of the AES and SSA forms as exempting it from Chapter 
93A misplaced. Chapter 93A applies to the actions of contracting par­
ties beyond the performance of the transaction's written agreements, 
and a standard form's choice of law provision concerning what law 
will govern the "interpretation, validity, and effect" of an agreement is 
insufficient to bar the applicability of Chapter 93A to the conduct of 
parties otherwise within its scope. 
Therefore, I will adopt the Recommendation of the Magistrate 
denying Burroughs' motion for summary judgment' as to Black's 
claims against it under Chapter 93A in Count III of the complaint. 
Black has moved to amend its complaint by adding an additional 
Count IV for negligent misrepresentation and by increasing the 
amount of damages alleged in' the three existing counts. Black has also 
moved to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of filing six addi­
tional interrogatories and a request for production of documents. 
Black states that its motion to amend is the result of deposition analy­
ses. Burroughs has objected to both motions. 
Once a responsive pleading has been filed, a complaint may be 
amended only by leave of court or with the written consent of adverse 

. parties. F.R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave of court is to be given freely when 

justice so requires, id., and, as the Supreme Court has explained, ab­

sent "any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith 

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

8. See Affidavit of Thomas E. GarvaIe, Controller of Burroughs Corporation; Affida­
vit of Jacob F. Vigil, Corporate Director of Engineering of Burroughs Corporation. 
9. See Affidavit of Lewis A. Black, at 2-3. 
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deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 
'freely given.''' Farnan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). While I am 
inclined to question why "deposition analyses" prompted a motion to 
amend almost three years after the filing of the complaint in this case, 
I cannot say that plaintiffs motion is so tardy as to amount to "undue 
delay." Furthermore, inasmuch as the allegations of the proposed 
Count IV closely relate to the existing counts of plaintiffs complaint, I 
do not find that undue prejudice will result to the opposing party by 
virtue of allowance of the amendment. See generally 3 Moore's Fed­
eral Practice ~~ 15.08, 15.10 (1980). Thus, I will allow Black to 
amend its complaint by adding an additional Count IV and by increas­
ing the amount of damages sought under Counts II and III. Inasmuch 
as I am today allowing Burroughs' motion for summary judgment on 
Count I of the complaint, Black's motion to amend by increasing the 
damages sought under that count will be denied. 
With respect to Black's motion to reopen discovery, I note that 
the date for the close of discovery has previously been extended in this 
case, and that I entered an Order on November 30, 1979 extending 
discovery until February 20, 1980 with the specific admonition that no 
further extensions would be allowed. In its memorandum in support 
of its motion to reopendiscovery, Black states the following: "without 
a clear showing of prejudice to the Defendant, and with the Plaintiff 
having demonstrated a particularized need for additional discovery, as 
can be perceived from the plain language of the Document Request 
and Interrogatories, it is urged the interest of substantial justice would 
be served by the discovery order being amended so as to permit the 
said Plaintiff to obtain the material requested in its discovery re­
quests." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 4. The short answer to this argu­
ment is that substantial justice is equally well served by counsel's 
timely and diligent attention to the development of a case. The sub­
stance of the matters sought to be explored in plaintiffs proposed in­
terrogatories and document requests is hardly new; rather. the 
information sought should have been the subject of plaintiffs discov­
ery efforts from the outset. Absent compelling circumstances, and 
there are none here, a motion to reopen discovery filed well over a year 
and a half after the close of discovery should be, and will be, denied. 
CONCLUSION 
With respect to Burroughs' objections to the Magistrate's Recom­
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mendation, because I have concluded thatthere are no genuine issues 
as to any material fact and that Burroughs is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Count I of plaintifrs complaint, I will reject the Rec­
ommendation of the Magistrate and enter summary judgment for Bur­
roughs on Count I; however, because I find that there are genuine 
issues of material fact with respect to Counts II and III of Black's 
complaint, I will accept the Recommendation of the Magistrate deny­
ing Burroughs' motion as to these two counts. Furthermore, I will 
allow Black's motion to amend its complaint by adding a new Count 
IV and by increasing the damages sought under Counts II and III, but 
will deny plaintifrs motion to reopen discovery. 
An appropriate order shall issue. 
Frank H. Freedman 
United States District Judge 
ORDER 
December 18, 1981 
FREEDMAN, D.J. 
This case came before me on the objections of defendant Bur­
roughs Corporation to the Findings and Recommendation of a Magis­
trate that its motion for summary judgment be denied; and on the 
motion of plaintiff Samuel Black Company to amend its complaint and 
to reopen discovery. Having reviewed de novo those portions of the 
Magistrate's Recommendation to which objection has been made, and 
having considered the factual record in this case, the memoranda of 
counsel, and the pertinent authorities, and for the reasons set forth in 
the Memorandum entered this date, I have determined as follows: 
1) That the Magistrate's Recommendation should be, and hereby 
is, REJECTED, with respect to Count I of plaintifrs com­
plaint, and summary judgment should be, and hereby is, AL­
LOWED with respect to this count. 
2) That the Magistrate's Recommendation should be, and hereby 
is, ACCEPTED with respect to Counts II and III of plaintiff's 
complaint, and summary judgment is DENIED as to these 
counts. 
3) That plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint should be, and 
hereby is, ALLOWED with respect to Counts II, III, and IV. 
4) That plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint should be, and 
hereby is, DENIED with respect to Count I. 
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5) 	 That plaintitrs motion to reopen discovery should be, and 
hereby is, DENIED. 
Summary judgment for the defendant Burroughs Corporation on 
Count I of the complaint of plaintiff Samuel Black Company. 
It is so ORDERED. 
Frank H. Freedman 
United States District Court Judge 
